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ADMIRALTY-STATE JURISDICTiON IN ToRT.-The claimant was employed as a
pipe fitter on a ship. While going down a ladder from the deck to the wharf
below he fell into the water, breaking his leg by striking against a "bumper log"
extending from and fastened to the wharf. The claimant proceeded under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and received an award. The defendant appealed.
Held, that the state court had jurisdiction. Lermond's Case (1923, Me.) ig
AtL 864.
The case is well within the authorities and illustrates that the controversy
under the decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U. S. 205, 37
Sup. Ct. 524, arises only when the injury is sustained on navigable waters. See
The Plymouth (i865, U. S.) 3 Wall. 20; Berry v. Donovan (1921) 1:20 Me. 457,
i5 At. 250; (1923) 8 CORN. L. QuART. 360. For discussion of Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra, see COMMENTS (1917) 27 YALE LA w JouRNA, 255;
COMMENTS (1918) 27 ibid. 924.
BANwRUPrTC Y-DEFEcT or ORIGINAL PETITIONING PAxTIES-SUBSEQUENT JOINDER
OF INTERVENING CREDos.-Three creditors filed a petition against a debtor
under secs. 3 (b) and 59 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act, requiring three petitioners
having provable claims. Nine months later two other petitioning creditors
were joined under sec. 59 (f). One of the original petitioning creditors did not
in fact have a provable claim. The plaintiffs, opposing creditors, contested the
petition, claiming also a lien on the debtor's funds by attachment within four
months. The debtor was adjudged a bankrupt and the opposing creditors
appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Canute Steamship Co. v. Pitts-
burgh (Nov. 12, 1923) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1923, No. 72.
The Supreme Court expressly adopts the rule of the lower courts that where
the petition is sufficient on its face, an amendment will be allowed adding to
the number of petitioning creditors even after the four month period and that
such amendment relates back to the date of the petition. In re Plymouth
Cordage Co. (905, C. C. A. 8th) 135 Fed. iooo; In re Charles Town Light &
Power Co. (1910, N. D. W. Va.) 183 Fed. 16o; I Collier, Bankruptcy (r3th ed.
1923) 663; cf. In re Stein (1904, E. D. Pa.) 13o Fed. 377 (petition insufficient
on face).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EmINENT DOmAn-N- CONDEMNATION OF LAND FOR A
TOWN Srn.-The United States proposed to erect a reservoir necessitating the
flooding of three-fourths of a town in Idaho. An act of Congress authorized
the condemnation of suitable land for a new town site, to be plotted and
exchanged for the property to be flooded. Act of Mar. 4, 1921 (41 Stat. at L.
1367, 1403). The defendant's land was part of a tract selected for the new
town site. From a judgment condemning his land on payment of its value by
the United States, the defendant appealed, contending that the taking was for
a private use. Held, that the judgment of the lower court be affirmed. Brown
v. United States (Nov. 12, 1923) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, x923, Nos. 97 and 98.
The decision is an illustration of the majority view that public use in relation
to the power of eminent domain means a use which will promote public interest
and not of necessity a use by the public at large. (1917) 26 YALE LA W JOURNAL,
418; 9 A. L. R- 583, note; see NoTEs AND COMMENT (919) 4 CORN. L. QUART.
64. For a strong dictum, but with an equally strong dissent, that under the
power of eminent domain land may be taken for a town site, see Tuttle v. Moore
(19go, Ind. T. C. A.) 64 S. W. 585; NOTES (rpoa) 15 HARv. L. REV. 399.
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CONTRACTs-AsSIGNMENT-EFFECT OF SPECIFIC PROVISION AGAINST ASSIGN-
MENT.-The defendant issued to its customers profit sharing stamps containing
a provision that they were not transferable and were redeemable only by the
person to whom originally issued.. The plaintiff sued as assignee of the original
holders. The lower court gave judgment for the defendant and the plaintiff
appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v.
Siegel, Cooper & Co. (923, Ill.) i4o N. E. 864.
The instant case is in accord with the general rule that the assignment of an
instrument containing on its face a provision against transferability creates no
rights in the assignee against the maker of the instrument. Bonds Foster Lum-
ber Company v. Northern Pacific Ry. (199o) 53 Wash. 3o2, OI Pac. 877; cf.
Bitterman v. Railroad Co. (1907) 207 U. S. 205, 28 Sup. Ct. 91; NoTEs (iO8)
22 HAuv. L. REV. 5o. But the assignment may be operative as against third
parties. Portuguese Bank v. Willes (1916) 242 U. S. 7, 37 Sup. Ct. 3; Fortunato
v. Patton (1895) 147 N. Y. 277, 41 N. E. 572. By statute in several jurisdictions
provisions restricting assignment are made inoperative. Thomassen, v. DeGoey
(1907) 133 Iowa, 278, iio N. W. 581; Pond Creek Coal Co. v. Lester (i916) 171
Ky. 811, 188 S. W. 9o7. See COMMENTS (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 308.
MANDAMUS-STUDENT'S WRONGFUL ExPULSION FROM PRIVATE EDUCATIONAL
INsTiTUTIN.-The faculty of a private college, without a hearing, expelled a
student on the ground of conduct which it deemed undesirable. The lower
court denied an application for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel
reinstatement. Held, that the denial was correct. Barker v. Trustees of Bryn
Mawr College (1923, Pa.) 122 Atl. 220.
Mandamus is the proper remedy against a public school from which a student
has been wrongfully expelled or denied a degree. Gleason v. University of
Minnesota (19o8) 104 Minn. 359, ii6 N. W. 65o. In some states it also lies
against a private institution. Baltimore University v. Colton (i9o4) 98 Md.
623, 57 Atl. 14; Harker, Use of Mandamus to Compel Educational Institutions
to Confer Degrees (igii) 2o YALE LAW JOURNAL, 341. But other courts have,
as in the instant case, refused the writ because the relation between a student
and a private institution is considered purely contractual. Booker v. G. R.°
Medical College (i9o9) 156 Mich. 95, I2O N. W. 589; Castleberry v. Tyler
Commercial College (i919, Tex. Civ. App.) 217 S. W. ii2; Ann. Cas. 1912
C, 89o, note.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-SUPERVENING LUNACY-ANNULMENT AT SUIT OF SANE
PARTY.-The defendant, an incurably insane man, married the plaintiff, who was
unaware of his condition. He was not guilty -of fraudulent misrepresentation
or concealment. There was issue. Upon discovering his condition, the plaintiff
ceased cohabitation; and later sued for annulment. Held, that the marriage
should be annulled. Whitney v. Whitney (1923, Spec. T.) 2oi N. Y. Supp. 227.
The result in the rare cases in which it is reached, seems to distinguish mar-
riage from contracts generally. Daniele v. Margulies (1923, N. J. Ch.) 121 Atl.
772; Chapline v. Stone (1898) 77 Mo. App. 523. Public health is a sufficient
justification for the rule. Liske v. Liske (1912, Spec. T.) 135 N. Y. Supp. 176.
The legtimacy of any children is sometimes expressly preserved by statute.
N. Y, C. P. A. 1921, art. 67, sec. 1135; Cf. 2 N. J. Comp. Sts. 1911, p. 2022.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-PoLICEMAN.-A city
policeman was killed in the exercise of his duties. His administrator sued the
city for damages under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Held, that the policeman was an employee within the Act and that the city was
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liable in damages for his death. Fahler v. City of Minot (1923, N. D.) 194
N. W. 695.
Public officers, since they partake of the sovereignty of the municipality in its
governmental capacity, are generally denied recovery under Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts. Ryan v. New York (192o) 228 N. Y. 16, 126 N. E. 350; Chicago
v. Industrial Commission (1920) 293 Ill. 188, 127 N. E. 351; (192o) 2o CoL L.
REv. 230; (1920) 34 HARv. L. REv. 91; (1914) 12 MIcH. L. REv. 7o2; io A. L. R.
2O, note. The instant case is in accord with a small minority representing
what seems the better view. Segale v. St. Paul Ry. (1921) 148 Minn. 40, 18o
N. W. 777; McCarl v. Houston (1919) 263 Pa. i, io6 Atl. lO4; cf. Kid v.
Industrial Commission (1916) 163 Wis. 44i, 158 N. W. 68.
TRusTs-CHARmTABL. PuaRosE-CY-Pats DocmINE.-The testator devised real
property in trust for the plaintiff to be used as a site for a church, providing
that it should revert to his heirs if not so used. The property became inadequate
in size, and the plaintiff petitioned that the defendants as trustees be compelled to
sell the property and to purchase another site for the use of the plaintiff. The
lower court refused the relief and the plaintiff appealed. Held, that the judg-
ment be affirmed as the cy-pr~s doctrine could not be applied. First Congrega-
tional Soc. of Bridgeport v. City of Bridgeport (1923) 99 Conn. 22, 121 Atl. 77.
When it is shown that the donor had a general charitable intent, cy-pr~s will
apply. Richards v. Wilson (1916) 185 Ind. 335, 112 N. E. 780; Bristol Baptist
Church v. Conn. Baptist Convention (1923) 98 Conn. 677, 12o At. 497; 3
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4 th ed. 1918) sec. 1O27. See NOTES (1917)
4 VA. L. REV. 224. Otherwise if it appears that-the gift was for a particular
purpose only. McAuley v. Wilson (1828, N. C.) i Dev. Eq. 276; Bowden v.
Brown (19o8) 2oo Mass. 269, 86 N. E. 351; Perry, Trusts and Trustees (6th ed.
1911) sec. 727; (1921) i MicH. L. REv. 335; (1923) 9 VA. L. REv. 23o. On the
facts in the present case some courts might have found a general charitable
intent. See NoTEs (1920) 33 HARv. L. Rxv. 598.
WILLs-UwATsTE DoCUMENTS-INcoRPORATION BY REFERENcE.-The testator
left a will in which he bequeathed $5,ooo to his executrix and executors to be
distributed according to his wishes as expressed in a sealed letter to be found
with the will. The sealed letter, apparently written later on the same day, was
found with the will. The complainant, the beneficiary under the letter, filed this
bill to compel payment by the executors. Held, that an unattested document
making a disposition of property cannot be incorporated in the will by reference.
Murray v. Lewis (1923, N. J. Eq.) 121 Atl. 525.
It is doubtful whether the will in the instant case satisfied the usual require-
ment that an unattested document to be incorporated must be an existing docu-
ment, and that the will must clearly refer to it as such. But the court adopts
the minority view represented by Connecticut and New York and wholly rejects
the doctrine of incorporation by reference. Hatheway v. Smith (1907) 79 Conn.
5o6, 65 Atl. io58; In re Etmon's Will (i9o6, Ist Dept.) 11o App. Div. 701, 96
N. Y. Supp. 506; contra: Shulsky v. Shulsky (1916) 98 Kan. 69, 157 Pac. 407;
see COMMENTS (1905) 14 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 226; Chaplin, Incorporation by
Reference (1902) 2 CoL. L. REv. 148; NOTES (1911) I COL. L. REV. 456;
COMMENTS (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 673; (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 1170;
(1920) 33 ibid. 872; 68 L. R. A. 353, note.
